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INTRODUCTION
There has been a shift in environmental policy tools from moral suasion and direct
regulation to market based instruments since these instruments are generally more flexible,
efficient and cost-effective in achieving environmental policy objectives (Tietenberg, 1991).  Yet,
the actual efficiency gains from economic instruments have been found to be lower than their
theoretical potential (Hahn, 1989, Hahn and Stavins, 1992).  Among the potential reasons for
economic instruments not functioning properly is the influence of transacttion costs (Kohn, 1991,
Stavins, 1995, Smith and Tomasi, 1995, McCann and Easter, 1998).
The concept of transaction costs has been associated with Coase (1992), who broadly
defines these costs as the resources spent on successful consummation of an exchange.  The
concept has been used largely  to explain organizational behavior of industries, firms and markets.
Within the environmental policy literature, transaction costs has been defined much more
narrowly and in terms of two sub-components.  One component involves the costs of policy
design, administrative costs, and enforcement.  This tradition formalized in Polinsky and Shavell,
(1982) has been referred to by Griffin and Bromely (1982) as policy transaction costs and by 
Thompson (1999) as institutional transaction costs.  The other component considers search,
bargaining, monitoring and enforcement costs.  These market transaction costs have been formally
modeled by Stavins (1995) in an analysis of tradable permit markets for pollutants and more
recently by Montero (1997), Vatn (1998), and Ganghadaran, (1999).  The gap in the literature is
in unifying the analysis of the different kinds of transaction costs for economic instruments and
analyzing their impact on social welfare.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for environmental policy choice2
from an analytical model that incorporates a complete definition of transaction costs of economic
instruments.  In assessing the social welfare impacts of economic instrument selection, the
transaction costs of both the regulator and the firm in successfully executing the policy are
accounted for.  The paper begins with discussion of the standard model without transaction costs
for determining the optimal level of pollution and how the regulator is indifferent to taxes or
permits under such assumptions.  The next section of the paper describes transaction costs and
how the concepts apply to the application of economic instruments for environmental policy
purposes.  Policy and marketing transaction costs along with their arguments are defined for both
the polluting firm and the regulator.  The final section of the paper incorporates these transaction
costs to select for the optimal policy instrument.  The results show that emission levels change
with the characteristics of the instrument and from the standard model approach.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CHOICE WITHOUT TRANSACTION COSTS
The objective in environmental policy design is to achieve a given level of ambient air or
water quality at least cost (Kelman, 1981).  The standard model presented below demonstrates
that either with Pigouvian taxes or  tradable permits socially optimal  pollution control is
achievable.  In this model, that follows that of Polinsky and Shavell (1982), we assume perfectly
competitive input and output markets. A representative firm’s production function given by
f(X,e).  Inputs are represented by vector X and e is the level of emission (unit weight/per period)
in the production process.  The external harm produce by emission is characterized by the surplus
of emission produced by the firm above its emission constraint e .  The emission constraint is
* 
determined by the regulator and the damage function, D (e-e ), is assumed to be linear.  Firms sell
*3
their output at price P and inputs price vector is given by vector W.  The social planner maximizes
the social welfare subjected to the firm’s meeting the emission constraint.
(1) Max  W = P f (X,e) - W X-  µ ( e-e  ). e
*
where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the emission constraint for the firm.
The first order condition:
(2)  P f  (X,e)- µ  = 0 e
gives the standard result the optimal level of pollutant is where the marginal damage from an
additional emission is equal to the firm’s marginal gain from emission.  This socially optimal
emission level can be achieved either by a Pigouvian tax equal to µ or by restricting total
emissions in a permit market for which the equilibrium permit price will also equal µ.
There are two qualifications to make about this socially optimal pollution level and the
capability of economic instruments to achieve this level.  As Vatn, 1998 noted, the standard model
above does not account for transaction costs associated with measuring emissions and
implementing the solution arrived in the first order condition.  In deriving the marginal conditions
for the efficient intensity of pollution control (2), it is assumed that the transaction costs of
implementing the solution is zero (Kohn, 1991).  Furthermore, this formulation does not provide
any explanation of the suitability of a given economic instrument over another.  Each policy
instrument corresponds to different resource requirements for its successful execution. Therefore,
to incorporate resource requirements for the different economic instruments, we have to adopt a
social welfare perspective in instrument choice.4
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSACTION COSTS
Transaction costs economics as initiated by Coase assesses the relative merits of alternative
organizational arrangements for trade by focusing on the nature and size of barriers between
parties that reduce potential gains from trade.  The choice among alternative organizational
arrangements turns on a comparison of the costs of transacting under each (Masten et al, 1991).
Those costs depend on aspects such as the frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity of a given
transaction (Williamson, 1985).  The appropriate organizational mode for a transaction
(hierarchically or in markets or by regulatory bodies) will be the one that brings the intended
results of the transaction at lowest cost.
The successful execution of an economic instrument for environmental purposes invovles
the facilitation of a transaction.  The transaction is either between polluting firms and the
regulator (Pigouvian taxes) or between polluting firms with the assistance of the regulator
(tradable permits).  However, these transactions do not consist of voluntary exchange typical in
market transactions but instead invariably involve some kind of coercion.  Voluntary market
transaction that internalize Pareto relevant externalities is, as Baumol and Oates, 1988 noted, 
only valid for a small number cases and therefore they note for such cases the Coasian property-
right approach may well be the most sensible way to control the externality.
The costs of administrative involvement with coercion inevitable with pollution problems
have been termed by both Griffin and Bromley (1982) and Thompson (1999) as “transaction
costs” without clearly explaining the underlying transaction.  These administrative costs are
largely borne by the regulator executing the program and firms are passive followers but firms will
bear the burden of some costs of monitoring and reporting their emissions under any policy5
approach to pollution control (Seskin et al, 1982).  As with Pigouvian taxes, resources will be
spent by both firms and the regulator to affect the intended transaction.  Rather than assume no
costs for the regulatory body in a tradable permits policy and only firms are involved in the
exchange of tradable permits, Hahn (1990) notes that the regulatory system is more complicated
with emission trading.
In developing a unifying theory to accommodate the forms of transaction costs discussed
in the environmental policy literature, we categorized transaction costs into two broad groups;
policy transaction cost and market transaction costs.  Both firms and the regulator incur these
costs and they are discussed below.
Policy and Market Transaction Costs for the Firm  R  (T(m,  D,  L), M(I, S, N, E)) Ff f ff f f f
The transaction costs associated with a given environmental policy for the firm, R  , is function of F
two types of costs; policy transaction costs T, and market transaction costs M.
Policy Transaction Costs for the Firm T(m, D, L) ff f
Policy transaction costs for the firm are the firm’s incremental administrative costs in
complying with the economic instrument.  These are borne in the form of monitoring costs, time
spent completing forms, and the expenses of resolving disputes over tax liability (Polinsky and
Shavell, 1982).  Following Polinsky and Shavell, 1982, we formulate policy transaction cost of
firm, T(m,  D,  L), as a function of three arguments.  The argument m is  the monitoring costs by f f  f f
firms when they have to pay emission taxes.  To determine its tax liability or to contradict any tax
claims of the regulator, the firm has to measure its emission level.  The argument D  is desk work f
and filling forms.  The last factor, L  is the cost involved in liability resolving.  For example, if a f 6
firm disputes the regulator’s tax claim, it has to follow administrative procedures and
subsequently incur costs.
Market Transaction Costs for the Firm  M(I, S, N, E) ff f f
Following Stavins, 1995, we formulate market transaction cost of firms, M, as a  function
of four arguments; I = information cost for the firm, S = search cost for the firm for trade ff
partners, N= negotiation costs, and E = enforcing the negotiated terms.  These costs items are ff
widely known in the literature and no further elaboration is provided here at this time. 
Policy and Market Transaction Costs for Regulator R  (T(e, I, P ID ), M(e, M,  A)) G g g  g g g  g  g
The regulator also faces two types of transaction costs.
Policy Transaction Costs for the Regulator  T(e , I , P   ) gg g I d g
Policy transaction costs for the regulator are the transaction costs most frequently referred
to in the environmental policy literature (i.e. Griffin and Bromley, 1982).  We follow the
Thompson (1998) specification so that the regulator’s policy transaction costs, T(e , I , ID , P ), g g  g  g
are a function of e  = enactment costs of the policy, I  = implementation cost of the policy, ID  = g g g
inducement and detection costs of compliance, and P  = prosecution cost of non-compliant firms.  g
McCann and Easter (1998) have estimated these costs for different policy options for phosphorus
pollution control in Minnesota.
Market Transaction Costs for the Regulator  M(e ,M , A ) g g g
Market transaction costs for the regulator are not considered in the literature, however, as
Dales (1968) notes, tradable permits are basically administrative tools.  Therefore, they incur











































implementing tradable emission rights.  The market transaction costs for the regulator in
implementing an environmental policy, M(e,  M,  A), is formulated as a function of e  = g g  g g 
enactment costs of the tradable permits, M = monitoring cost for the regulator, A  = g g
administration costs for the continuation of tradable permit system.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CHOICE WITH TRANSACTION COSTS
The standard model presented earlier is now extended to include transaction costs as an
economic instrument selection criterion.  The firms’ emission function, e(a,  R  (T(m, D, L), Ff f f
M(I, S, N, E)), depends on abatement costs a, and transaction costs of the economic instrument ff f f
R  .  In this specification we assume  e(.) is strictly concave function in R  and a. We also assume F F
R  (.) is strictly concave function in both its argument.  We further assume cross partials of R  , F F
i.e., 0 R  /0T 0M and 0 R  /0M 0T are negative.  Given the emission function and the transaction
22
FF
cost functions for the firm and regulator presented above, the social planner’s objective to
maximize social welfare with emission control in the presence of transaction costs can now be
formally stated as;
(3) Max  W = Pf(X,e(a, R (T(m,D,L), M(I, S, N, E)))-W X - R  (T(e,  I,  P ID ), M(e, T, M F f f f f f f f G g g g g g
M,  A))- )( e(a, R  (T(m, D, L), M(I , S , N , E) - e ). g g F f f  f f f  f  f
*
First order conditions for above maximization is (we suppress the arguments in both R  and R ) FG
















































































































Rearranging (4) and (5) we can get; 
(6)
(6')
The resultant social optimum with transaction costs is different from standard model in two
important dimensions.  Firstly, our choice variable in the standard model was emission level e. 
However, the choice variables for the second model are policy transaction costs (T) and market
transaction costs (M).  Secondly, if transaction costs vary among the instruments, the optimal
emission level for each policy will be different.  However, we can compare the socially optimum
emission levels in the two models and infer the impact of incorporation of transaction costs on the
socially optimal emission level.  Recall we assumed that both R and R (T, M ) are increasing FG
functions of T and M.  We also assumed e(a, R (T, M)) is an increasing function of R . Therefore, FF
from (6) or (6') we can infer that   Thus, the socially optimal emission level with
transaction costs is lower than under the standard model.  We cannot determine the size of this
departure from the standard model.  However, the important result of the analyses is that
incorporation of transaction costs makes optimal level of pollution varied among economicP


















































































































































































. We assume that implementing economic instruments with incurring transaction costs provide social
1
benefits. Therefore, the terms and  are  assumed to be positive.
instruments. 
The welfare impacts of having either type of economic instrument could be mathematically
demonstrated by taking the total derivative of equation (4) with respect to T and M.  We can then
model social indifference curves in T and M space indicating the combination of policy and market
transaction costs with the same level of social welfare.  Then for this social indifference map we
can introduce an emission constraint as a budget constraint.  The total derivative of (4) with
respect to T and M is
(7)
Social welfare indifference curves in T and M dimension are given by dW=0 for a given level of
W.  The social welfare indifference curves given by dT/dM are negatively sloped, i.e., dT/dM < 0 . 
1
The curvature of welfare indifference curve could be ascertained with signing dT / d M.  We define 
22
 and  Therefore, 
dT / d M =  - [(A )(0B/0M) + (B)(0A/0M)]/(A) .  We can derive 0B/0M and 0A/0M as follows;
22 2
0B/0M= [P(0 e/0 R  .0 R  /0T 0M)- µ(0 e/0R   .0R   /0T 0M) - (0 R  /0T 0M)]
2 2 2 2 2. 2. 2
FF F F G
0A/0M= [P(0 e/0 R  .0 R  /0 M)- µ(0 e/0R   .0R   /0 M) - (0 R  /0 M)]
22 2 2 2 2 . 2 . 2 2 2
































































. As the transaction costs of an economic instrument’s  increases,  social welfare for a given level of
2
emission control will be decreased at increasing rate. 
The cross partial of R  (.) is assumed to be zero.  We assume W is a strictly concave function  in F
2
both M and T, therefore, 0A/0M >0.  Taking this information together, we have dT / d M < 0, 
22
indicating downward sloping concave welfare indifference curves in T and M space.
Similarly emission constraint could also be portrayed as iso-emission curves for a given
level of emission.  An rmission constraint is given by e(a, R  (T(m, D, L), M(I , S , N , E)) = e  in F f f  f f f  f  f
*
the above model.  Iso-emission lines could be generated for different level of e  in T and M space. 
*
Total derivative of emission constraint with respect to T and M gives;
(8)
The slope of the iso-emission curve dT/dM is negative ( given the characteristics of e(.) and R (.)).  F
Defining
 and  then 
dT / d M =  - [(C )(0D/0M) + (D)(0C/0M)]/(D) f o r  w h i c h
22 2
0C/0M= (0 e/0 R  .0 R  /0T 0M) and  0D/0M= (0 e/0R   .0R   /0 M).
2 2 2 2 2. 2. 2
FF F F
Using the same assumptions about zero cross partials of R  (.) and with the assumption that e(.) is F
strictly concave in M, we have iso-emission lines that are concave and downward sloping in T, M
space.  
We can depict both welfare indifference curves and iso-emission lines in T and M space.11
Higher welfare levels are with the indifference curves that are closer to the origin (since welfare is
decreasing in both T and M).  Social welfare will be maximized moving to the lowest welfare
indifference curve subject to a given level of emission constraint.  We can have three possible
situations depending on the relative sizes of the curvatures of iso-emission line and welfare
indifference curve.
(1). Equal curvature for the both curves
This is a very unlikely situation. However, in such a situation both instruments are capable
of achieving same level of social welfare subjected to the chosen emission constraint. This
situation is not interested in environmental policy formulation.
(2). A tangency between iso-emission and welfare indifference curve.
This is the theoretical optimum if substitution between T and M is possible but we cannot
substitute at the margin between T and M.  Also when such a tangency occurs, moving to a corner
solution across the relevant welfare indifference curves (in selecting one instrument) does not
differentiate across the instruments.
(3). Crossing of two curves.
Whenever the two curves cross, a corner solution results and the optimal instrument
selected  will depend on two characteristics; relative steepness of the curves and the chosen
emission constraint.  What determines the relative steepness of the two curves?  As we have seen
in determining the slope of both curves, the functions such e(.) R (.) and R (.) and their FG
specification play important roles.  It must be noted that the recent literature in economic
instrument choice has focused on the requirement of characterizing the above functions. McCann
and Easter (1998) try to estimate the policy transaction costs with policies such as extension12
services, and input taxes for controlling phosphorus pollution in the Minnesota River.  Thompson
(1999) compares institutional transaction costs with a non-tradable permit system and an effluent
charge system to control pollution from textile mills.
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to distinguish the alternative forms of transaction costs referred
to the environmental policy literature and to bring these transaction costs into a unified theory. 
The optimal choice of economic instrument between Pigouvian taxes and tradable permits is
shown to depend on the level of transaction costs as opposed to the standard model where both
emission taxes and permits are first best policies to achieve a level of emissions.  It is
demonstrated that inclusion of transaction costs decrease the socially optimal emission level as 
compared to the standard model.  Instrument selection is affected by the functional specification
for instrument costs for both firm and regulator level.  Depending on the nature of these costs
optimal economic instruments will be different.13
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